I am the author of Federal Crimes, a survey of the most commonly charged federal felonies. It gets updated every year. That's an extraordinarily broad subject, and I rely on a number of secondary sources to help me keep up with all of the law in all of the circuits.
As explained here, the most important resources are the official pattern jury instructions and their accompanying annotations. I regularly check in on each circuit, and write blog entries here describing the specific changes when a circuit publishes revised instructions (working on Eighth Circuit civil and criminal instructions now). I keep a mailing list for folks who want to be notified when I post these blog entries.
I also try to note relevant sections in the
Justice Manual (JM) (formerly titled as the United States Attorneys' Manual or USAM). The JM is a compendium of Department of Justice policy memoranda. With the deadline for the 2026 edition of Federal Crimes coming up, I wanted to make sure that my references to the JM were accurate and up-to-date.
Here is how I did it. I searched the Internet for 2025 additions or revisions to the JM using the query "2025]" site:justice.gov/jm, and compiled the results into a list. Ordinarily, I would have brought up prior versions of these JM provisions using the
Wayback Machine database on archive.org. At that point I could have block copied text from both versions, plugged them into Word, and generated a
redline/strikeout, but that was going to be a bit labor intensive.
Instead, I decided to try using artificial intelligence, specifically Copilot AI. I am certainly aware of controversies regarding AI legal research. That being said, for my purposes the AI summaries, edited for concision, are just there to help me flag relevant changes with links to the official text. I thought that readers of this site might be similarly interested in such a survey.
There are a couple dozen changed provisions in all (a large number perhaps occasioned by the change in administrations). Feel free to share this post with others who might be interested in keeping up with JM changes, and let me know if you spot an error.
The 2025 update centers on restraint prohibitions.
Reaffirms and sharpens the ban on chokeholds and carotid restraints.
Clarifies definitions of “chokehold” and “carotid restraint” to remove ambiguity.
Tightens the exception: these techniques may only be used when the deadly-force necessity standard is met.
Expands the scope to explicitly include task force officers acting under DOJ authority.
Requires DOJ components to maintain internal policies reflecting the prohibition.
Introduction to the Office of the Executive Secretariat (OES)(OES originated in 1982 as an internal liaison and document-coordination function).
Defines the office’s core purpose: ensuring that leadership decisions are made with proper consultation, accurate information, and timely coordination.
Clarifies OES’s central role in managing the flow of official documents and information across DOJ leadership offices and components.
Creates a formal, enumerated list of OES coordination functions.
Defines OES as the central clearing and tracking hub for all official documents requiring review, approval, or signature by DOJ leadership (AG, DAG, ASG).
Adds explicit responsibility for managing senior-level correspondence, including communications addressed to DOJ leadership from internal and external stakeholders.
Introduces structured oversight of interagency requests, both incoming and outgoing, when they involve DOJ leadership.
Formalizes OES’s role in departmental clearances, including submissions from other federal agencies that require DOJ review.
Clarifies that the listed functions are non-exhaustive, giving OES broad authority to manage document flow and coordination across DOJ.
Creates a formal routing rulebook for what must pass through the Office of the Executive Secretariat (OES).
Defines five major categories of documents that must be routed through OES, including
Official records or decision documents requiring AG/DAG/ASG signature,
correspondence addressed to DOJ leadership,
interagency requests requiring DOJ leadership approval or concurrence,
select departmental clearances coordinated by OES,
and any additional materials designated by leadership offices.
Adds explicit exceptions for certain rulemakings, clarifying when OES routing does not apply.
Clarifies relationship to JM 1-8.000, stating that nothing in 1-23.300 supersedes the Congressional and White House Relations chapter.
Establishes a formal district-level framework for responding to “critical incidents,” including terrorism, mass-casualty events, or extraordinary criminal events requiring coordinated federal action.
Creates explicit requirements for
Critical Incident Response Plans (CIRPs) in every USAO,
Critical Incident Response Teams (CIRTs),
Mandatory coordination with FBI Field Divisions,
Mandatory notifications (NSD/CTS, EOUSA Urgent Reports, JCC, federal law enforcement, federal courts, and state/local authorities as appropriate)
Defines detailed roles and responsibilities for:
U.S. Attorneys,
Crisis Management Coordinators (CMCs),
National Security/ATAC Coordinators,
EOUSA, NSD
Introduces annual exercise requirements, after-action reviews, and annual CIRP updates.
Clarifies division of responsibility between the CMC and National Security/ATAC Coordinator depending on whether an incident is or is not believed to be terrorism-related.
Explicitly supersedes any prior inconsistent guidance.
The update centers on expanding and clarifying the description of the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) and its operational model.
Adds a significantly expanded description of the PCSF, which earlier versions treated more briefly.
Clarifies PCSF’s structure as an interagency partnership led by the Antitrust Division and staffed by attorneys from the Division’s criminal enforcement program.
Updates the list of interagency partners, now explicitly noting that current partners are listed on the PCSF’s public website.
Adds detail on the district-based operational model, describing how each district team includes: at least one Antitrust Division attorney, an Assistant U.S. Attorney, and agents from each national law-enforcement partner
Reinforces PCSF’s mission: outreach, training, investigations, and prosecutions related to collusion in public procurement.
The introductory paragraph describing the Division’s criminal enforcement mission remains substantively unchanged from prior versions.
Adds a new paragraph describing the Task Force on Healthcare Monopolies and Collusion, which did not appear in earlier archived versions.
This addition highlights DOJ’s increased emphasis on antitrust enforcement in healthcare markets.
Refines the description of the civil enforcement program’s mission, keeping the core functions intact but tightening the language around merger review, anticompetitive conduct, and damages recovery.
Clarifies the Division’s role in administering the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in coordination with the FTC.
Updates the structure and flow of the section to align with the 2025 formatting used across Title 7.
Creates a new, standalone description of the Antitrust Division’s Litigation Program, which previously had no dedicated section.
Defines the program’s mission as strengthening litigation readiness across both criminal and civil enforcement.
Introduces three core functions: Providing experienced litigators and trial advisors to partner with trial teams, developing and maintaining knowledge-management resources on litigation topics, and offering logistical and administrative support throughout the trial lifecycle.
Clarifies the program’s cross-cutting role, supporting all enforcement sections rather than operating as a standalone prosecutorial unit.
The 2025 update reorganizes the guidance, expands several obligations, and modernizes the structure of DOJ’s criminal-discovery policy. The core legal authorities remain the same, but the methodology and expectations for prosecutors are more detailed than in prior versions.
Reorganizes the section around a four-step framework:
Gathering and reviewing discoverable information, conducting the review, making disclosures, and making a record.
Expanded guidance on defining the “prosecution team.”
New, detailed expectations for reviewing agency files.
Expanded the discussion of:
Access to investigative files,
review of confidential informant/source files,
handling of “substantive” case-related communications,
treatment of agent notes and witness-statement variations.
More explicit guidance on Giglio-related review, with clearer expectations for
conversations with law-enforcement witnesses, handling Giglio information for non-law-enforcement witnesses, reviewing benefits, agreements, and credibility-related material.
The 2025 revision strengthens DOJ’s emphasis on:
early and broad disclosure when appropriate, balancing disclosure with witness safety, privacy, national security, and investigative integrity.
Avoiding the phrase “open file” to prevent misunderstandings.
Creates a new DOJ-wide requirement that all DOJ agents and investigators must enter ballistics evidence into NIBIN, following ATF procedures.
Expands the scope to include firearms and fired cartridge casings recovered during any criminal investigation, including those involving state, local, Tribal, or territorial partners.
Clarifies responsibility: the obligation applies regardless of which agency physically possesses the evidence.
Adds a timeliness mandate.
Introduces logistical support language: ATF will assist agencies lacking a nearby NIBIN acquisition site, including through ATF Field Divisions and national NIBIN labs.
Emphasizes NIBIN’s investigative value, highlighting increased entries and investigative leads as part of the justification for the new mandate.
Re-centers the policy on balancing law-enforcement needs with the protection of lawful newsgathering.
Reinforces that compulsory legal process targeting news media is an extraordinary measure and a last resort.
Adds more explicit requirements for Attorney General authorization before:
Issuing subpoenas to news media members, obtaining their communications or business records from third parties, applying for search warrants targeting news media premises or property.
Clearer definitions and scope rules; clarifies who qualifies as a member of the news media and what constitutes lawful newsgathering, emphasizing case-by-case determinations.
Adds explicit exclusions for individuals engaged in terrorism, foreign-agent activity, or aiding such conduct.
Detailed standards for subpoenas and compulsory process
(requires prosecutors to show that the information is essential, narrowly tailored, and unavailable from alternative sources).
Strengthens requirements for voluntary negotiations with media before compulsory process is used, unless doing so would jeopardize the investigation.
Adds a structured timeline for notifying affected media members when their records are obtained from third parties.
Allows limited, AG-approved delays when notice would threaten investigative integrity or safety.
New and expanded rules for questioning, arresting, or charging journalists
Requires Attorney General authorization before questioning, arresting, or charging a journalist for conduct related to newsgathering.
Adds a narrow exigent-circumstances exception for imminent threats (terrorism, death, serious bodily harm, etc.).
Integrates with 28 C.F.R. § 50.10, directing attorneys to the full rule for operational details.
“Premises” now explicitly includes electronic devices, communications content, and third‑party provider accounts (email, social media, cloud).
The policy now expressly covers employees, contractors, agents, paralegals, accountants, consultants, and unlicensed/disbarred practitioners when client‑related materials may be present.
The 2025 version adds a new clause covering business organizations when legal‑advisor materials are involved.
The former version lacked all electronic‑content language and the extended list of covered individuals.
The scope is now far more explicit and technologically current, and it captures a wider set of people and storage locations.
"Alternatives to Search Warrants" was expanded and modernized, adding communications content held by third-party providers to the examples of evidence sought.
The prior version only referenced “an attorney actively engaged in the practice of law,” not electronic content.
The “least intrusive means” analysis is now explicitly tied to modern data sources.
The Consultation Requirements now require prosecutors to submit a PSEU intranet form, including attached special instructions and filter protocols.
It uses the term “filter team” instead of “privilege team.”
The 2025 version emphasizes early information sharing and deadlines more explicitly.
Requirement to discuss protocols with the filter team before the search, explicit instructions about preventing taint, option to attach protocols to the affidavit,
more detailed expectations for electronic-evidence handling.
Expands references to electronic devices, electronic records, and third‑party communications content. The former version Only references “computers” and older CCIPS guidance.
Creates a formal DOJ-wide standard for no-knock warrants
Establishes a presumption against no-knock entries. The new policy makes it clear that no-knock warrants are disfavored and may be used only when announcing presence would create an imminent threat of physical harm, or announcing presence would likely result in the destruction of evidence essential to the case.
Adds mandatory supervisory approval. Before seeking a no-knock warrant, agents must obtain:
Supervisory approval within their agency, and Prosecutorial review to ensure the legal and factual basis meets DOJ’s heightened standard.
Requires detailed justification in the warrant affidavit. The affidavit must now include
specific facts supporting the need for a no-knock entry, an explanation of why alternative tactics are insufficient, and a description of risk-mitigation planning.
Adds operational safety requirements: Pre-operation briefings, consideration of time-of-day and occupant information, use of de-escalation tactics when feasible, coordination with prosecutors on risk assessment.
Clarifies that state and local task-force officers must follow DOJ policy. Even when operating under state law, deputized task-force officers must comply with DOJ’s stricter federal standard.
The policy no longer applies only to FCPA cases. It now governs all corporate criminal matters handled by the Criminal Division, including fraud, money laundering, FEPA, and other corporate-crime statutes.
Presumption of declination for qualifying companies. Companies that voluntarily self-disclose, fully cooperate, and timely and appropriately remediate
will receive a presumption of declination, absent aggravating circumstances.
Expanded definition and requirements for voluntary self-disclosure.
Must disclose all relevant non-privileged facts, including about individuals.
Disclosure must occur before an imminent threat of government investigation.
Detailed standards for “full cooperation.” Requires attribution of facts to specific sources (when not privileged), rolling updates during internal investigations, proactive identification of evidence not in the company’s possession, voluntary preservation and production of overseas documents, and making employees (including overseas personnel) available for interviews.
Requirements for record-retention controls, including restrictions on ephemeral messaging.
Mandatory discipline for responsible employees.
Revised treatment of aggravating circumstances.
Aggravating factors (e.g., executive involvement, pervasive misconduct, recidivism) may defeat the presumption of declination, but companies may still receive a declination if they meet extraordinary cooperation/remediation standards. This “extraordinary cooperation” pathway is new.
New fine-reduction framework.
If a criminal resolution is warranted companies with voluntary self-disclosure receive 50%–75% off the low end of the Guidelines range. Companies without voluntary disclosure but with full cooperation may receive up to 50% off. Recidivists are treated differently, with reductions not anchored to the low end.
Integration with DOJ’s 2023 M&A Policy. It incorporates the Department-wide M&A safe-harbor policy (misconduct discovered in pre- or post-acquisition diligence may qualify for a presumption of declination if disclosed within 180 days and remediated within one year).
Clearer statement of MLARS’s role as the primary component responsible for notification requirements, consultation, and approvals, and the involvement of the Tax Division,
U.S. Attorneys, and Criminal Division Deputy Assistant Attorneys General.
4. New emphasis on cross-Manual coordination, depending whether JM Chapters 9-47.000 (foreign corruption), 9-51.000 (cyber-enabled crimes), and JM 9-90.020 (national security) are involved.
Expands MLARS authority, restructures the approval framework, and adds new categories of cases requiring notification, consultation, or formal authorization.
Broadens the categories of cases that require
notification to MLARS when an investigation opens, and
MLARS approval before filing charges or resolving a case.
The four categories now requiring MLARS authorization are:
Extraterritorial-jurisdiction cases under §§ 1956/1957,
transactions involving attorneys’ fees,
cases where a financial institution is a defendant or unindicted co-conspirator,
and individual culpability for certain BSA/AML program violations.
New, detailed submission requirements for approvals.
A prosecution memo must accompany approval requests.
Draft charging documents or resolution documents must be submitted to MLARS.Approvals@usdoj.gov.
Prosecutors are encouraged to engage MLARS early and regularly.
Expanded list of matters requiring MLARS consultation. Three categories now require mandatory consultation before charges or civil actions: Forfeiture of businesses or assets tied to unlicensed money transmitting, civil actions under § 1956(b),
and “receipt and deposit” cases involving SUA proceeds placed into accounts belonging to the offender. The “receipt and deposit” guidance is more explicit than in prior versions, emphasizing when such charges are inappropriate.
A new two-step process for identifying and resolving potential “merger” problems—where the SUA and the money-laundering transaction overlap so closely that charging both may be improper, with expanded examples of merger-issue scenarios.
The revision clarifies that Tax Division approval is required when
the principal purpose of the § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) transaction is tax evasion, or
when the indictment includes other charges requiring Tax Division approval.
Modernizes DOJ’s internal reporting workflow to ensure the Attorney General can meet statutory notification duties under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(g).
Expanded and more explicit list of covered offenses: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, 1960. and
31 U.S.C. § 5324.
More precise definition of “financial institution.”
The update clarifies that reporting applies when the defendant is a national bank, federal savings association, federal credit union, or federally insured state depository institution
Or an officer, director, or employee of such an institution.
Components must send MLARS a certified copy of the judgment of conviction, including the lead prosecutor’s name and investigative agency, submitted via the MLARS.
Clarifies that reporting is required even if MLARS was not previously involved.
The revision is stylistic and clarifying, not a substantive policy shift.
DOJ will not prosecute an attorney under § 1957 for receiving bona fide fees for legitimate criminal-defense representation unless there is:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual knowledge of the illicit source, and
That proof does not rely on privileged or confidential client communications.
Expanded explanation of what counts as a “bona fide fee”: Fees paid in good faith for representation of the client’s own criminal liability, Third-party payments that do not create conflicting obligations, Exclusion of sham or fraudulent transactions designed to shield assets.
More explicit treatment of “actual knowledge.” Actual knowledge cannot be based solely on willful blindness. Actual knowledge cannot be established using:
Pre-representation confidential communications, communications during representation, or
information obtained in the course of representation.
New examples and illustrations. The 2025 text adds more concrete examples of when prosecution may or may not be appropriate, such as:
Attorneys functioning as “in-house counsel” to a criminal enterprise,
attorneys hearing non-privileged admissions before representation begins,
or situations where pre-representation publicity is not enough to establish knowledge.
Clarified relationship to § 1957(f)(1)’s Sixth Amendment carve-out.
Tax Division approval is required when:
The indictment also includes charges that independently require Tax Division approval (e.g., tax-fraud conspiracy), or
the sole or principal purpose of the financial transaction is to violate 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (tax evasion) or § 7206 (false return).
Reorganized explanation of the statutory background.
The revision clarifies that approval is not required when:
The principal purpose of the transaction is something other than tax evasion (e.g., promoting drug trafficking), the circumstances do not warrant filing substantive tax charges, or any tax-evasion motive is merely secondary and apparent from the nature of the laundering transaction.
More explicit cross-references to normal review procedures.
The update clarifies that, except in OCDETF cases, Tax Division approval follows the standard process, including IRS review.